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WHY NOW IS NOT THE TIME FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT: THE LIMITED REACH OF CITY OF BOERNE
V. FLORES
KENT GREENAWALT"
I. INTRODUCTION

When the Supreme Court eviscerated the protection of the
Free Exercise Clause in Employment Division v. Smith,' religious groups and individuals dismayed by the decision chose to
pursue statutory relief rather than a constitutional amendment.
Now that the Supreme Court has decided in City of Boerne v.
Flores2 that the resulting statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act' (RFRA or the "Act"), cannot be justified as a congressional exercise of power under the Fourteenth Amendment,
many who care deeply about religious liberty may turn to the
amendment process as an alternative. Although disappointed by
the Fores decision, I believe it is premature to seek a constitutional amendment that would explicitly protect religious conduct
from the operation of neutral, valid laws. The Supreme Court
has not ruled out effective statutory relief. Until it does so, that
course is preferable to amendment.
In this essay, I do not address whether the Court was justified in its conclusion about Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Nor do I analyze the merits of other constitutional arguments against RFRA, which I have previously
urged are unconvincing.5 This essay explores the implications
of what has been said and not said by the Court, with an eye
* University Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law, LL.B., Columbia University; B. Phil., Oxford University, A.B. Swarthmore College.
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
4. For a discussion of this topic, see Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status
and Prospects of 'Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 342-50.
5. See id. at 337-42.
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to what opponents of Smith should now do.
II. THE BASES FOR EMPLOYMENT DIVISIoN V. SMITH AND CITY
OF BOERNE V. FLORES
If one puts aside the surprising analysis of prior constitutional
law, the heart of the Court's opinion in Smith was that courts
cannot effectively apply a constitutional standard that requires
assessment of individual claims that neutral laws seriously and
unjustifiably burden religious exercise.' No intelligent observer
can doubt the Court's observation that such inquiries are often
difficult; those who disagree with the Court believe that the value of religious freedom is great enough to justify the inquiries
nonetheless.
The Court in Smith indicated clearly that some legislative
accommodations for religious exercise are definitely acceptable.
For example, a state legislature may permit members of a religious group to use peyote in worship services.7 The Court impliedly endorsed some other such accommodations that state and
federal legislatures have accorded.8 Justice Stevens has a different view about accommodations. His brief opinion in Flores concluded that RFRA was an invalid establishment of religion because religious claimants should not receive benefits unavailable
to nonreligious claimants.9 Justice Stevens is the only member
of the Court who has taken the position that uneven benefits
make an accommodation unconstitutional. According to existing
constitutional law, specific legislative accommodations to religious exercise are generally acceptable. °

6. The Court said, for example, that leaving exemptions to the political process
"must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all
religious beliefs." Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
7. See id.
8. See id. (stating that "a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation
as well').
9. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring).
10. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (discussing legislative exceptions for peyote
use in Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico).
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If a legislature can make a specific accommodation, can it also
make a general one? That is, rather than itself deciding when
religious claimants should be exempted from ordinary legal
requirements, can a legislature enact a broadly worded privilege
for religious exercise that courts apply on a case-by-case basis?
This issue is not resolved by either Smith or Fores. Smith asserted that courts have great difficulty applying a broad constitutional standard for religious exemptions." But Smith did not
say that if a legislature instructed courts to apply a broadly
worded standard, the standard would be so unwieldy that it
would impose an unconstitutional burden on the courts. Some
scholars, defending Smith and criticizing RFRA, have argued
that such legislative instruction would violate the separation of
powers between the legislative and judicial branches because it
imposes a burden that courts are not fit to bear. 2 Smith itself,
however, does not go that far.
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Flores repeated
some of the language in Smith: "[C]Ilaims that a law substantially burdens someone's exercise of religion will often be difficult to
contest."" But Justice Kennedy came no closer than did Smith
to saying that a broad legislative accommodation is necessarily
unconstitutional. Flores was fundamentally about Congress's
power vis-A-vis the states, not about Congress's power vis-a-vis
its own enactments, nor about state legislative power vis-a-vis
state enactments. Flores does not tell us whether Congress can
qualify past and future federal legislation by RFRA-like language. Flores does not tell us whether a state legislature can
similarly qualify its own past and future legislation. What I
mean by "qualifying its legislation" is creating an exemption for
religious exercise cast in broad language that applies both to
statutes already enacted and to any new statutes. 4 We do not

11. See id. at 886-87.
12. See, e.g., Joanne C. Brandt, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5 (1995);
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994).
13. Fores, 117 S. Ct. at 2171 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 887).

14. Because new legislation takes priority over old, the same legislature that has
enacted a provision like RFRA could provide specifically for its inapplicability in
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know whether the present Court, or any future Court, would
accept such broad statutory accommodations.
III. FLORES AND

THE

MISSING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Flores involved a local historic preservation ordinance under
which a Roman Catholic bishop was denied a permit to enlarge a
church. 5 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress's power
is the same with respect to state and local governments. 6 The
decision in Florescovered RFRA as it applied to all state and local
governments. The Act was held invalid in that application. But
what of RFRA's application to the federal government? What of
the Act's application to past and future acts of Congress and the
federal executive? The Court never discussed that directly, but
the second and third sentences of the opinion read: "The case calls
into question the authority of Congress to enact RFRA. We conclude the statute exceeds Congress' power." 7 That language
reads as if the statute is unconstitutional across the board. Other
language in the opinion is similar; for example, the Court emphasized the broad sweep of RFRA, highlighting its application to
government at every level. 8 Moreover, the Court later remanded
a case involving federal bankruptcy law for reconsideration in
light of Flores.9 The remand does not prove that the Court
thought that Flores resolved the federal case, but if the Court

some future enactment.
15. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
16. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 479-80 (1968) (finding that
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause applies equally to states and
localities).
17. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
18. See id. at 2162 (citing examples of RFRA's "universal coverage").
19. See Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir.
1996), vacated and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997). In Christians, debtors
transferred $13,450 to a church less than a year prior to filing a bankruptcy petition
under federal law. See id. at 1410. The trustee was successful in an attempt to recover the contribution from the church. See id. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit held that the contribution was an avoidable transfer and could be
recovered by the trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2). See id. at 1416. But the Court
applied RFRA and held that the church did not have to return the contribution because the burden on religious exercise was not supported by a compelling government interest. See id. at 1420. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of
the Flores decision. See Christians, 117 S. Ct. at 2502.
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concluded that Flores had no bearing on the case, keeping the
case for a Supreme Court decision might have made more sense
than a remand. How are we to understand the Court's position on
RFRA's application to the federal government?
A. Inattention
One way to understand Flores is as an opinion implicitly directed to the statute's application to states and localities. That
was precisely the question raised by the Fourteenth Amendment
argument in Flores, and perhaps we should not suppose the
Court meant anything more. This understanding is mildly supported by a sentence in the opinion that reads: "Congress relied
on its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power in enacting
the most far reaching and substantial of RFRA's provisions,
those which impose its requirements on the States."2
The difficulty with this understanding is the Court's plain
language about the statute's invalidity.2 The Justices were
aware of arguments against RFRA-establishment and separation-of-power arguments-that had direct relevance to the law's
federal applications.' If they decided on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, then why did they not explicitly say that their
decision resolved only the validity of applications against state
and local laws? Of course, inattention is always a possibility, but
the opinion could not likely have survived without any Justice or
law clerk noticing this issue. Compromise over language is a
more probable explanation. In any event, passages in the opinion read as if RFRA is invalid in all its applications, although
the Court's Fourteenth Amendment theory definitely does not
cover applications against federal laws.
B. Nonseverability
Some Justices might have reasoned in the following manner:
Congress wanted to create a broad religious exercise exemption
20. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 2160, 2162, 2172.
23. See Transcript of Oral Argument, City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157
(1997) (No. 95-2074), available in 1997 WL 87109, at *17, *32-33.
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that would apply to all agencies of the government in the United
States. Unfortunately, it had no power to adopt such a law in
respect to most of those agencies. We cannot know whether Congress would have wanted such a law for the federal government
had it realized it lacked such power for states and localities.'
Therefore, the provisions of RFRA are not separable insofar as
they reach various branches of government. If the Act is invalid
for state laws, then it is invalid for federal laws.
Such an argument is not persuasive. Given what Congress
actually did, it seems more plausible to suppose that it wished
all the coverage it could get. The issue of congressional power
vis-a-vis federal laws has yet to be addressed, and it requires
separate evaluation.
Even if the argument of nonseverability were sound or, more
importantly, if it persuaded the Justices, its logic would not
preclude fresh congressional legislation, similar to RFRA, that
applies only to federal laws and executive acts.
C. Wrong Theory
Some Justices might have adopted a variation of the preceding argument, believing that Congress acted upon an assumed
power to remedy constitutional violations and to expand Courtannounced definitions of constitutional rights. The enforcement
power of the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow legislative
redefinition of rights established or rejected by the Court;' and
RFRA was not really designed, and was not suitable, to remedy
and prevent violations of the rights the Court had declared. Any
congressional power to enforce the First Amendment against the
federal government is similarly limited; therefore, Congress
lacked the only basis it imagined it had for the Act, and, without
that basis, the Act would be invalid in its entirety.
This is a puzzling argument as it applies to the Act's applications against the federal government. Congress can qualify the

24. My language here, and at some other places, is "mentalist" about Congress.
For those who regard notions of what Congress wanted or intended as fictions, or as

inappropriate guides for courts, the points could be reformulated in terms of the apparent objectives of the language Congress adopted.
25. See Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 342-50.
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coverage of its own acts and acts of the federal executive in any
way it chooses, so long as its qualifications do not violate constitutional provisions.26 Congress does not need any independent
constitutional base to excuse people from conformity with ordinary federal standards. It could, for example, exempt from taxation people who have reached a certain age or who suffer physical disabilities, so long as the exemptions do not create constitutionally invalid categories." Similarly, Congress can create exemptions based on religious exercise if they do not violate constitutional restrictions. The scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, therefore, has no bearing on the power of Congress
to enact RFRA as it applies to the federal government.
If Congress does not need a separate constitutional base to
qualify federal legislation, then what should be the effect of
what the Court regards as congressional misunderstanding of
the Fourteenth Amendment? Congress enacted a standard it
regarded as desirable. Even if the constitutional ground for that
legislation-the Fourteenth Amendment-was misconceived,
then Congress would still have enacted the legislation within its
plenary power over prior and future federal legislation. In brief,
any difference of view between members of Congress and the
Court over the Fourteenth Amendment should have no relevance
for the law's federal applications.
Even if the "wrong theory" argument has more force than I
acknowledge and has influenced some Justices, its logic no more
precludes fresh RFRA legislation that applies only against the
federal government than does the logic of nonseverability.
D. Separation-of-PowersDefect
Some Justices may believe that RFRA violated separation of
powers as it applied to the federal government. No such argument is adopted in Flores, but it may be lurking in the background. How should one assess this possibility? Justices

26. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976) (acknowledging Congress's plenary authority in the areas of its legislative jurisdiction subject to constitutional
restrictions).
27. See 26 U.S.C. § 63(f) (1994) (providing additional exemption amounts for the

aged and blind).
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O'Connor and Souter almost certainly would overrule the holding of Smith.28 They believe a standard of evaluation like
RFRA's does not violate separation of powers because they suppose such a standard is constitutionally required. Justice Breyer
joined in their call for a review of Smith, indicating that he has
serious doubts about the validity of the rule of that case.2" Justice Stevens asserted that any broad accommodation to religious
exercise is unconstitutional.30 The separation-of-powers objection to RFRA will probably command the balance of the Court
only if four of the five remaining Justices endorse it. Justice
Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Flores hardly affords a confident basis to conclude that they will do so.
Because federal constitutional law does not mandate strict
separation of powers within the states," the Supreme Court
might strike down a federal law that uses a standard like
RFRA's for the federal government but permit a similar statute
within a state. It is true that the separation-of-powers objection
to RFRA approaches the related objection that a legislative ,directive to courts to apply an unmanageable standard for religious exercise amounts to an establishment of religion. If such a
standard were thought to violate the Establishment Clause,
neither Congress nor state legislatures could adopt it. But the
establishment claim is not exactly the same as the separation-ofpowers claim, and so the fate of one would not necessarily determine resolution of the other.
I am puzzled that the Court did not more carefully articulate
the exact parameters of its holding of invalidity. Certainly one
cannot glean from the opinion that the Court definitely embraced the separation-of-powers challenge to RFRA. The Fourteenth Amendment federalism argument has no direct bearing

28. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2176 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting).
29. See id. at 2186 (Souter, J., dissenting).
30. See id. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens noted that RFRA
"has provided the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental preference for religion as opposed to irreligion is forbidden
by the First Amendment." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
31. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957). But see Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
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on the Act's application to federal laws, and the absence of congressional power under that amendment is the only constitutional defect the Court found.
IV. WHY AN AMENDMENT WOULD BE PREMATURE

Our country has never adopted a constitutional amendment to
overturn a Supreme Court decision defining the scope of the Bill
of Rights.32 I strongly believe the absence of such amendments
has helped strengthen the symbolic force of the Bill of Rights.
Any amendment to overturn an unpopular decision will make
subsequent amendments of that kind easier to adopt. If the first
such amendment overturns a decision someone does not like,
then the next two or three may overturn decisions the same person favors. In recent history, there have been strong movements
to amend the Constitution to permit prayer in public schools"
and punishment of flag-burners.34 These anti-civil-libertarian
amendments might well have been adopted if they had been preceded by an amendment to create broad religious exemptions
from neutral laws. One need not be rigidly against amendment
of the Bill of Rights in all circumstances to think that this method to correct judicial decisions is very strong medicine that
should be avoided when possible.
At this stage, we do not know if an amendment is the only
way to undo Smith. Perhaps RFRA itself still validly applies to
the federal government; or if RFRA does not, then perhaps Congress can enact valid legislation limited to that effect. States
may be able to enact similar legislation.35 Congress and the
states should follow this course. To be on the safe side, Congress
should reenact a form of RFRA limited to federal laws and executive acts. In order to rebut any assumption that Congress's new

32. There is an exception, if one counts the adoption of the Thirteenth Amend-

ment as "overruling" the decision in Dred Scott v.Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857), that slaves are property protected under the Fifth Amendment.
33. See Geoffrey R. Stone, In Opposition to the School Prayer Amendment, 50 U.
CHi. L. REv. 823 (1983).
34. See Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?,100
YALE

L.J. 1073 (1991).

35. Moreover, state courts can adopt the compelling interest test as the proper
approach to free exercise problems under their state constitutions.
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legislation assumes the earlier act is wholly invalid, the new law
should declare Congress's understanding that RFRA continues to
be valid in its federal applications.
Friends of religious liberty should press state legislatures to
adopt similar laws. Such efforts may be less spectacular, and
more onerous, than a constitutional amendment, but, if attitudes
in Congress are any guide, the great majority of state legislators
will favor such laws. It is entirely possible that a combination of
federal and state legislative action will achieve most of the protection of religious exercise that Congress designed RFRA to
grant.3 6 That will make a constitutional amendment unnecessary, and may help prepare for the day when a Supreme Court
more protective of religious liberty will overrule Smith.

36. It is unlikely that every state will adopt such a law; protection in any state
that fails to adopt such a law, and in which courts have not adopted a compelling
interest test for a free exercise clause in their state constitution, will be less than it
was under RFRA.

